SEBI Rajesh Exports Inflated Revenue: ₹15.15 Lakh Crore

SEBI alleges Rajesh Exports inflated revenue by a staggering ₹15,15,385 crore, roughly ₹15.15 lakh crore, through what regulators describe as prima facie misrepresentation of nearly 99.8% of its subsidiary-linked revenues between FY21 and FY25. To put that in perspective, that figure is larger than the GDP of many sovereign nations. And it was hiding, allegedly, inside the glittering annual reports of one of India’s most celebrated gold companies.

Welcome to what may be the most audacious accounting scandal in Indian corporate history, one where the gold was real, but the revenue numbers, says SEBI, very likely weren’t.

A Company Built on Subsidiaries and Blind Faith

Rajesh Exports, headquartered in Bengaluru, had long been one of India’s most jaw-dropping revenue stories. The company, which owns Swiss gold refinery Valcambi SA, routinely reported consolidated revenues that dwarfed even some PSU behemoths. Investors marvelled. Analysts nodded. LIC quietly accumulated a 10.8% stake. Mutual funds, more sceptically, largely kept their distance for a decade, a detail that, in hindsight, looks rather prophetic.

SEBI’s order shows that between FY21 and FY26, subsidiaries and step-down subsidiaries contributed between 97.43% and 99.20% of Rajesh Exports’ total consolidated revenue. In FY25 alone, the company reported consolidated revenue of ₹4,23,099 crore, but its standalone revenue was a modest ₹7,027 crore. In other words, almost everything that made Rajesh Exports look like a titan lived inside its overseas subsidiaries. The Indian parent company was, by itself, a fairly ordinary mid-sized gold firm.

That wasn’t inherently illegal. But it meant that investors had to trust the subsidiary-level financials completely. And that, says SEBI, is precisely where the trouble began.

The Valcambi Problem: Big Numbers, Thin Paper Trail

SEBI found a glaring mismatch. In CY 2023, Valcambi’s standalone revenue was around ₹542.68 crore. Yet its parent entity, GGR, reported consolidated revenue of roughly ₹2.92 lakh crore and Rajesh Exports’ own consolidated figure came in at around ₹2.80 lakh crore. The company’s defence? Valcambi recognised only processing revenue or value addition, while GGR booked the gross value of gold transactions. SEBI was not persuaded. The regulator said this explanation was prima facie unsupported, noting that the inflated revenues shown at the consolidated level were not backed by Valcambi’s audited standalone statements or any credible underlying transaction records.

So the subsidiary that was supposed to explain the revenues couldn’t actually account for them. And the parent company, rather conveniently, had not placed the subsidiaries’ financial statements in the public domain in any meaningful, verifiable form. The 109-page ex parte interim order, issued on June 3, 2026, alleged that nearly all of this revenue was channelled through overseas subsidiaries and remained essentially unverifiable.

Personal Trades, Company Books, and a Very Confused Broker

The forensic auditors didn’t stop at the revenue mismatch. They dug deeper and found a rather colourful set of transactions at the standalone level too.

SEBI’s investigation found that personal gold derivative trades by promoter and Chairman Rajesh Mehta were recorded as company transactions worth over ₹11,400 crore. Exchange fluctuations and interest income were also allegedly misclassified as operational revenue. These are not accounting footnotes. These are the kinds of entries that fundamentally change what a company’s income statement looks like to an unsuspecting investor.

Bank records examined by SEBI showed transfers of ₹338.90 crore from Rajesh Exports to Mehta between April 2020 and September 2025, against ₹232.44 crore transferred back to the company. The regulator said several of these transactions lacked clear commercial rationale, proper board approvals or regulatory disclosures.

Then came the broker episode, which is almost novelistic in its audacity. In September and October 2025, broker Affluence Shares and Stocks told SEBI that Rajesh Exports was never its client. The firm had dealt only with Rajesh Mehta in his personal capacity. SEBI checked the claim against GST records, banking data and other documents and found no evidence of direct transactions between Rajesh Exports and Affluence. So trades that appeared in Rajesh Exports’ books were, according to both the broker and SEBI’s own investigation, actually personal trades by its Chairman. The company and the Chairman, it seems, had a rather fluid understanding of where one ended, and the other began.

Cooperating With Investigators, Except When It Mattered

Rajesh Exports and Rajesh Mehta have publicly stated they are cooperating with the investigation. SEBI’s order tells a somewhat different story. The regulator said the company did not provide access to key accounting systems, books of accounts, and transaction records, significantly limiting the forensic auditors’ ability to verify large portions of the reported business activity.

That forensic audit report, submitted in March 2026, reportedly highlighted severe gaps. A fresh forensic audit has now been ordered. The auditors who signed off on the earlier accounts have been referred to the National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) for possible action, a detail that should worry every audit committee in India.

The Fallout: Stock Circuits, PLI Schemes, and Political Theatre

The market responded with the bluntness only free-falling stock prices can muster. Rajesh Exports shares hit lower circuit after lower circuit following the SEBI order, with the stock reported to be down over 50% year-over-year. SEBI has barred Rajesh Exports promoter and Chairman Rajesh Mehta from buying, selling, or dealing in the company’s securities pending further proceedings, and has ordered a fresh forensic audit of its books.

The collateral damage extends beyond the stock market. The Ministry of Heavy Industries, which administers the ACC battery storage PLI scheme, is reviewing the SEBI order before deciding its next course of action. Sources say there is a strong view within the ministry that Rajesh Exports should be excluded from the scheme. The company had positioned its pivot from gold refining to battery manufacturing as a bold new chapter. That chapter may now be closing before it properly began.

Meanwhile, the Congress party has demanded a Joint Parliamentary Committee probe, asking pointedly why the ED and CBI had not raised red flags about these alleged irregularities earlier. Canara Bank, which has exposure to Rajesh Exports, has publicly stated the position poses no systemic risk and that recoveries are underway, a reassurance that investors will be hoping is not itself built on creative accounting.

The Company Pushes Back, Gently

Rajesh Exports has filed documents with SEBI seeking to address the concerns raised in the interim order, calling its financial numbers genuine and describing the discrepancy as a communication error. The promoters have denied all allegations and said they will cooperate fully.

Whether that cooperation will extend to actually producing the subsidiary-level records that forensic auditors repeatedly requested remains to be seen. SEBI’s investigation continues, with the fresh forensic audit expected to provide deeper insights into the company’s financial structure, subsidiary operations, and inter-company transactions.

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What This Case Tells Investors

Rajesh Exports’ story is a case study in the dangers of consolidated revenue opacity. When 97% to 99% of a company’s revenue comes from overseas subsidiaries whose individual financials are not clearly and publicly available, investors are essentially flying blind. The consolidated number looks impressive on a screener. The footnotes, less so.

For years, Rajesh Exports was India’s revenue giant, a company that processed more gold than most countries mined in a decade. Whether that was a genuine reflection of its business or an elaborate paper construction is now for SEBI, forensic auditors, and eventually the courts to determine.

What is already clear is this: ₹15.15 lakh crore is not a rounding error. It is not a communication gap. It is either the most spectacular piece of accounting that Indian regulators have ever failed to catch, or it is the most spectacular piece of accounting that they have finally caught.

Either way, someone has a great deal of explaining to do.